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UNDERWATER WEAPONS

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Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010054-7

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UNDERWATER WEAPONS

The purpose of this report is to discuss the underwater weapons, the underwater research laboratories and plants, and the advantages in underwater weapons which the Soviet Union would acquire from countries of the Soviet Bloc and from those of Western Europe if these countries should be overrun by Russia.

I. CONCLUSIONS:

With the possible exception of Czechoslovakia and Poland, Russia would gain very little of significance as far as underwater ordnance is concerned by overrunning the countries of the Soviet Bloc. In the case of these two countries, there exists a significant industrial potential for producing mines, torpedoes and component parts.

In case Western Europe should be overrun the countries which would contribute the most to Russian potential as far as underwater ordnance is concerned are as follows:

Sweden: limited numbers of mines, torpedoes and some research and industrial production ability.

Norway: some British, German and U.S. mines and torpedoes.

Western Germany: considerable production ability.

France: Research laboratories, St. Tropez torpedo test center, considerable equipment now in the fleet.

Italy: considerable research, development and production capability.

Yugoslavia: limited quantities of German and Italian torpedoes, and some Russian mines are available.

The overrunning of countries such as Finland, Belgium and Portugal would add very little of significance to the Soviet potential as far as underwater weapons are concerned. Countries like Denmark, Austria, Spain and Switzerland have very little equipment of their own and would contribute to the Soviet potential chiefly through industrial production of component parts for underwater ordnance items.

II. DISCUSSION:

This report will discuss the advantage in underwater weapons which Russia would acquire if they should overrun the countries of the Soviet bloc and those of Western Europe.

It is assumed that the underwater equipments and facilities of these countries would be captured intact, including their stockpiles and warehouses, and that the management and labor of industrial concerns working on underwater weapons would be put at the disposal of the Soviets.

A. Soviet European Bloc:

1. Czechoslovakia - The Soviets, at the present time, are probably getting some production from Czechoslovakia in the way of mine and torpedo components. It is possible that many of the German World War II facilities may be contributing some research in mine firing devices. There also exists a potential for producing torpedoes.

2. Austria - There exists a production potential here and a limited research capability. The Goertz Optical Co. was active in German World War II mine work.

3. Hungary - As in the case of Austria, the potential exists in production. It is not believed that new underwater weapons will be developed here.

4. Romania - The USSR has been supplying Romania with mines and, undoubtedly, with any torpedoes that may be required. Romania could produce moored mines if required by the USSR to do so.

5. Bulgaria - Like Romania, Bulgaria is on the receiving end of underwater weapons from the USSR.

6. Albania - Limited quantities of Soviet mines, torpedoes and depth charges are most probably available to Albania.

7. Poland - has a production capability in underwater weapons. At present, Poland has French, German and Russian type torpedoes as well as German and Russian mines. There are indications that Poland has started production of moored mines for the Soviets.

B. Soviet Asiatic Bloc

It is very improbable that the Asiatic countries will develop any underwater weapons with the exception of improvised mines.

The Communist Chinese undoubtedly have available large quantities of Japanese World War II mines, and also quantities of Japanese torpedoes. However these stockpiles are presumably considered inadequate since reports have stated that the Russians have been sending mines and torpedoes into China. China, nevertheless, has production capabilities.

The status of Inner Mongolia cannot be determined, but if a potential exists, it is most probably one of production.

Korea will undoubtedly remain on the receiving end of Russian aid in underwater weapons.

C. Finland - No new underwater weapons under development.

D. Sweden - The most significant development is rocket-propelled depth charge with a proximity fuze. However, this weapon is not available now. Also reportedly under development are a passive and an active acoustic homing torpedo.

Sweden has available limited number of mines, both moored contact and ground influence; also available are limited quantities of torpedoes.

E. Norway - Under development is a rocket-propelled depth charge. However, this weapon is not yet available.

Present weapons include the following:

1. British, German and Norwegian torpedoes.
2. German pattern running torpedoes fired from shore installations.
3. Norwegian, British and U.S. mines.
4. U.S. depth charges and hedgehogs.

F. Denmark - Has no weapons under development. Available is a new modern torpedo test station. Denmark purchases mines and torpedoes from the British. Included in the underwater ordnance stockpile are approximately 1000 mines.

G. West Germany - This area has a production capability; no new weapons under development.

H. Netherlands - The Netherlands have available limited quantities of moored contact mines. No underwater weapons are under development.